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THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED
ON INADEQUACY OF DAMAGES
AWARDED
Donald R. Wilson*

This article represents an attempt to state the law governing
the establishment of an inadequate verdict, the basic requirements

in proving such a verdict and to suggest the policy considerations
which should be controlling in this area.
I.

INTRODUCTION

While the term has recently acquired substantial emotional
overtones by reason of its use in the controversy over what some
writers allege is the inadequate level of jury verdicts in negligence cases, an "inadequate verdict" in the sense the term is
employed here exists when the verdict returned is for an amount
less than the smallest sum to which plaintiff has shown himself
entitled if defendant is found liable, as where plaintiff's uncontested pecuniary losses are $10,000 and the jury brings in a verdict
for only $5,000. Excluded from this discussion are those cases
where the verdict, while small, can nevertheless reasonably be
sustained in terms of the evidence.
Theoretically inadequate verdicts can and sometimes do result from juror prejudice against plaintiff or against the nature
of his lawsuit, from sympathy for defendant, from a simple inability of the jurors to add or from a misunderstanding of the
applicable legal rules. However, the fact that the vast majority
of inadequate verdict cases found involve extremely close liability
questions clearly illustrates that the most important cause of the
inadequate verdict lies in the widespread tendency of jurors to
reduce the amount of plaintiff's award because of a general uncertainty over defendant's liability or as a means of compromising
their differences on defendant's liability. Indeed, it can fairly
be said that the inadequate verdict cases have furnished the courts
with about their only realistic opportunity for putting teeth into
B.S. 1958, LL.B. 1960, University of Nebraska; member Nebraska Bar
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the principle that liability and damage considerations are to be
kept separate. Under present practice, except for extraordinary
situations, juries must decide liability and damage questions at
the same time and jurors may not be questioned as to the basis
for their verdict. Short of changing the law in one or both of
these respects, there is no way of preventing jurors from compounding liability and damage considerations unless it is to be
in the inadequate verdict situation where the verdict, on its face,
gives a plainly justifiable ground for inferring that a compromise
has resulted. An examination of the court's handling of the inadequate verdict cases, apart from providing a much needed sketch
of a complicated area of civil procedure, will also provide important clues concerning actual judicial attitudes toward juries and
compromise verdicts.
Formulated rules concerning the handling of inadequate verdicts are many and varied and vast differences exist not only
among the states but between the state and federal courts. Distinctions, furthermore, abound. Much may or at least should depend, for example, on whether we are dealing with an inadequate
verdict which is merely nominal or one which, though inadequate,
is nevertheless substantial. Failure to draw this distinction has
in the federal system at least occasioned much needless confusion
and injustice. Differences exist also depending on which party,
plaintiff or defendant, objects to the inadequacy and sometimes
on the state of the evidence as to liability. There is likewise an
important question of waiver and of the proper nature of the
relief to be given from an inadequate verdict; whether it is to
be a complete new trial, a new trial on the issue of damages only
or perhaps a judicially ordered increase in the verdict, commonly
known as an additur. The various distinctions are noted and
suggestions made concerning the direction the law should take
in these various areas. At the outset, however, a brief historical
word.
II.
A. IN

HISTORY

GENERAL

The problems implicit in a motion for new trial on the ground
of a verdict's inadequacy are not confined to the United States
alone. The early English common law did not permit a new trial
on the ground of a verdict's inadequacy or excessiveness under
any circumstances.' It was felt that in tort actions in particular
1 Review was denied because of the historical limitation of the writ of

error to matters within the record, of which the motion for a new trial
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there was no scale upon which to weigh the damages other than
the intelligence of the jury. The jury was a favorite and almost
sacred tribunal and the law favored the presumption that jurors
acted on pure motives. A solemn trust of this nature could not
be, dispensed with by the granting of a new trial. At an early
date, however, the English courts recognized a distinction between
excessive and inadequate verdicts and began to allow a new trial
where the damages were grossly excessive and there was an obvious "miscarriage of jurors. 2 This early distinction has now
been removed in England and a new trial will be granted where
3
the verdict is so small as to be out of all proportion to the facts.
This early English distinction between excessive and inadequate verdicts likewise worked its way into early American jurisprudence in the form of statutes expressly forbidding the granting
of new trials for inadequacy of the verdict. 4 In contrast, new
trials for excessiveness of the verdict were freely granted in the
United States from the beginning.5 The basis for the distinction,
while shrouded in history, probably was the early American notion
that the jury not only possessed the power but the right to decide
cases contrary to the trial court's instructions and the feeling that
compromise verdicts, when rendered by a jury, were not such
was not a part. See I HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
226 (7th ed. 1956). The right of trial by jury was characterized by
Blackstone as "the glory of the English law." 3 BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES 378 (4th ed. 1876). For these reasons the early
English courts were slow to grant new trials under any circumstances.
2 The first English case found is Wood v. Gunston, Style 466 (1655)
which granted a new trial for an excessive verdict in a slander case.
Glyn, C. J. stated: "it is frequent in our books for the court to take
notice of miscarriages of jurors, and to grant new trials upon them."
3 By 1879 a new trial was granted in England where the motion was
founded upon the verdict's inadequacy. Phillips v. London & South
Western Rail Co., 5 Q.B.D. 78, C.A. (1879). In accord: Price v. Glynea
and Castle Coal and Brick Co. Ltd., 86 L.J.K.B. 1278, C.A. (1915),
Smith v. Schilling, 1 K.B. 429, C.A. (1928) and see: 30 HALSBURY'S
LAWS OF ENGLAND § 890 (3rd ed. 1959).
4 An example of such a limitation was found in the Washington statute,
since repealed. Laws of 1869, Ch. XXII New Trial § 279: "A new trial
shall not be granted on account of the smallness of damages in an
action for an injury to the person or reputation, nor in any other
action where the damages shall equal the actual pecuniary injury
sustained." The usual procedure was to make excessive verdicts a
specific ground for new trial while omitting a provision for inadequate
verdicts. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 651 (4) (1937).
5 Sampson v. Smith, 15 Mass. 365 (1819) and Rowland Lumber Co. v.
Ross, 100 Va. 275, 40 S.E. 922 (1902).
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terrible things after all. The early statutes precluding relief for
inadequacy of the verdict began to disappear early in the 19th
century and have now entirely disappeared. It is worthy of note
that Kentucky and Oklahoma steadfastly fought the repeal trend
for approximately one and one-half centuries.6
It is now everywhere settled that an inadequate verdict, may,
in an appropriate case, be set aside. Exactly what is meant by
an appropriate case, however, differs markedly from one jurisdiction to another and is sometimes difficult to determine within
a single jurisdiction. The many distinctions drawn in the various
states will be discussed subsequently.
Although state court rules concerning inadequate verdicts
differ markedly from one state to another, they are, for the most
part, fairly specific within each jurisdiction. This is far from the
case in the federal system. The most important difference between federal and state law in this area is that state appellate
courts have formulated a body of complex rules and principles
governing the situations in which state trial judges can and cannot award a new trial for inadequacy of the verdict. In contrast
to this body of rules federal appellate tribunals have done almost
nothing to guide federal district judges in ruling upon new trial
motions based upon this ground. Federal trial judges have long
had almost unlimited discretion in granting,as opposed to denying,
new trials on the ground of inadequate damages and federal appellate courts have only recently begun formulating rules covering those situations where a new trial must be granted for a verdict's inadequacy. A detailed analysis of the federal law will
be undertaken after the state decisions are reviewed.
6

The Kentucky limitation has been replaced with KEN. RULES CIV.
PROC., Rule 59.01 (4) which was adopted in 1953 and provides that

a new trial may be granted in the case of either an excessive or inadequate verdict. The case of Smith v. Bailey, 311 Ky. 118, 223 S.W.2d
582 (1949) has interpreted this new rule as requiring that the verdict
must strike the mind "at first blush as being a result of passion, prejudice, or mistake." The Oklahoma limitation was also removed in 1953
when OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 652 (1937) was repealed and
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 651 (4)

(Supp. 1953) was changed to

include inadequate as well as excessive verdicts. However, even before the 1953 change the Oklahoma Supreme Court seemed to be leaning heavily in favor of granting a new trial for inadequacy when it
stated, in Spence v. Park, 207 Okla. 215, 248 P.2d 1000 (1952), that
the statute would only be applicable "when the record is wholly free
from irregularities or erroneous rulings of the court which might have
resulted in the inadequate verdict." A careful reading of the opinion
reveals that the major ground for sustaining the granting of the motion for new trial was that of smallness of damages.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 39, 1960
B. WAIVER
Before turning to the mainstream of the inadequate verdict
case law, a substantial preliminary question presents itself for
disposal. This is the question of whether a litigant failing to
object to a verdict's inadequacy when the verdict is rendered
thereby waives his right to subsequently raise the question,
whether by a motion for a new trial or otherwise. In view of
the nature of the question posed, the paucity of cases discussing
the question is surprising. Especially is this so in view of the
fact that the so-called "waiver rule" as applied to jury verdicts
defective in other respects has had a long and productive history
as a new trial preventer. The "waiver rule" has been conclusively
offered as an answer to motions for a new trial based on the
ground that the verdict has not been signedJ or that it has been
signed improperly,8 or that there was error in the amount of the
verdict with respect to interest, 9 and in a great variety of other
situations. 10
It has, however, simply been assumed in the vast bulk of the
inadequate verdict cases that a litigant who is entitled to object
to the verdict's inadequacy may raise the question for the first
time by means of a motion for new trial. Only two cases have
been found discussing the waiver question, Wall v. Van Meter"
and Fischer v. Howard,'2 Kentucky and Oregon cases respectively.
The Wall case holds that an inadequate personal injury verdict,
limited to the exact sum shown by the evidence to have been
expended for medical treatment and awarding nothing for pain
and suffering, should have been set aside as invalid notwithstanding plaintiff's failure to object to its receipt at the time of the
trial and before the jury was discharged. The court drew a distinction between "mere irregularities" in the verdict, which are

7

Rucker v. Cox, 200 Ark. 247, 138 S.W.2d 778 (1940) and Northern
Pacific Railway Co. v. Urlin, 158 U. S. 271 (1894) where the jury
foreman failed to sign the verdict although a Montana statute required
his signature.

s Old 76 Distillery Co. v. Morris, 234 Ky. 389, 28 S.W.2d 474 (1930).

9 Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Steinkraus, 83 Neb. 1, 119 N.W. 23 (1908).
10 See 89 C.J.S. Trial § 525 (1955), for a complete discussion of many

"1
12

other situations where a failure to object before discharge of the jury
will amount to waiver.
Wall v. Van Meter, 311 Ky. 198, 223 S.W.2d 734 (1949).
Fischer v. Howard, 201 Ore. 426, 271 P.2d 1059 (1954).
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waived by failure to object, and "invalid verdicts," to which no
such objection is necessary. 13
The Oregon court, in Fischer v. Howard,'4 however, took a
different view. Fischer was an action to recover damages for
two separate assaults and batteries, plaintiff's evidence showing
that he sustained pecuniary losses of over $25.00 as a result of
the first affray and of $335.00 on account of the second. The jury
returned a verdict for plaintiff on both causes of action, awarding
him "$0" damages on the first and only "$35.00" on the second.
A divided Oregon Supreme Court, in an opinion by Judge Rossman, reversed the trial court's ruling granting plaintiff a new trial
because of the verdict's inadequacy, holding that plaintiff had
waived his rights by failing to object to the verdict and request
the issue be re-submitted to the jury. The Oregon Court also held
that the plaintiff could not raise the question of inadequacy for
the first time upon a motion for a new trial. Plaintiff's right to
a new trial had he objected before dismissal of the jury was
conceded.
The answer to the waiver problem appears to lie in the unfairness involved in requiring a litigant, in the heat of a trial,
to insist upon a re-submission of the question to a jury which
has already demonstrated its inability to reach an agreement
within the bounds of adequacy. Whether or not such a question
should, at any time, be re-submitted to the jury for further deliberations is most certainly doubtful. The following observations
of the New Jersey Courts in opinions dealing with analogous situations seem quite pertinent:
After a finding that the first verdict of a jury is so tainted, we
think it very questionable whether substantial justice can be accomplished by permitting15such a jury, on reconsideration, to settle
the rights of the parties.
[A] body of men so disregardful of the obligation resting upon
them should not be permitted to settle the Tights either of the
plaintiff or the defendant.16
Another practical problem involved in the waiver area is
that a rule requiring a re-submission of the case to the jury might,
Wall v. Van Meter, supra note 11, at page 736. See 89 C.J.S. Trial
§ 525 (1955) where cases illustrating this distinction are collected.
34 Supra note 12.
1 Elvin v. Public Service Coordinated Transp., 4 N.J. Super. 491, 67
A.2d 889 (1949). The case was reversed and a new trial ordered.
16 Faggoni v. Weiss, 3 N.J. Misc. 370, 128 A. 540 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
13
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in all probability, result in a substitution of the judge's opinion
for that of the jury. If the judge orders the case to be re-submitted
there is a definite possibility that the amount of the increase will
be determined after careful consideration, by the jury, not of the
evidence but of how far the judge feels they are from an "adequate verdict."
In concluding this section it must be emphasized that this
discussion deals only with the situation where a complete new
trial is contemplated and where the litigant subject to the waiver
is unquestionably entitled to a new trial in the absence of the
waiver.
III.

NOMINAL VERDICTS VS. SUBSTANTIAL
THOUGH INADEQUATE, VERDICTS

Let us now turn to the major configurations of the case law
in this area. Perhaps the most basic distinction is between the
merely nominal verdict and a verdict which, though inadequate,
is nevertheless substantial. Briefly the distinction is this: A nominal verdict is one which is not only inadequate but so palpably
inadequate with relation to the evidence as to plaintiff's actual
damages as to show that no honest attempt was made to assess
the damages against defendant. The substantial though inadequate
verdict, on the other hand, typically involves a compromise verdict
in which the liability and damage aspects of the case have been
illicitly compounded. 17 State court nominal verdict cases will
be discussed first after which substantial though inadequate verdict cases will be considered. Federal law will then be examined.
A. No MNAL

VERDICTS iN GENERAL

If the reported decisions are any criterion, the propensity of
juries to return nominal verdicts in disregard of the evidence as
to plaintiff's damages is only slightly less than the instances in
which their awards, though substantial, are nonetheless "clearly
20
9
8
inadequate." Verdicts for one cent,' six cents,' one dollar'
17

The term compromise verdict, as used here, refers to a situation where
the jury has obviously compromised the liability aspects of the case

with the damage issues, hence, never making a clear decision on
liability. Not included are those cases, often called compromise verdicts, where, although liability is certain, the jurors compromise their
true feelings upon damages only.
Is Haven v. Missouri Ry. Co., 155 Mo. 216, 55 S.W. 1035 (1900) and Davis
v. Whitmore, 43 Ariz. 454, 32 P.2d 340 (1934).
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and "no or none"2 1 damages have been popular. Excluded from
this discussion are those cases where it is inherently improbable
that plaintiff did, in fact, sustain any damages and the nominal
verdict can be reasonably sustained in terms of the evidence.

Unlike substantial though inadequate verdicts, defendants are
almost invariably willing, if not eager, to acquiese in nominal
verdicts. This type of a verdict will seldom, if ever, equal the
cost of a subsequent new trial and the only time a defendant
might find it necessary to overturn a nominal verdict would be
when he was interested in gaining a favorable appellate court
ruling on an important point of substantive law. This type of a
situation, of course, is exceedingly rare. However, in some of
those cases where defendant does appeal, it has been held that
defendant has no right to complain of a verdict for the plaintiff
in an amount less than plaintiff was entitled, since the verdict
is regarded as conclusively establishing that the defendant had
been found liable.2 2 This type of reasoning overlooks the very
obvious probability that the jury found for defendant, but, out
of sympathy for plaintiff, wished the costs of the trial taxed to
defendant. It takes no unusual stretch of the imagination to arrive at the conclusion that a nominal verdict is, in essence, a finding for the defendant.2 3 Failure to employ a little imagination
can in some cases result in clear injustice. In libel and slander
actions for example, defendant should clearly be allowed an opportunity to overturn the verdict and point out the probability
that such a verdict is actually a finding for his position.
The bulk of the litigation in this area deals with plaintiff's
right to have a nominal verdict set aside. One group of cases,
perhaps a majority, holds that such a verdict must be regarded
as a perversely-expressed finding for the defendant which cannot
be set aside unless, of course, the trial court could properly have
19 Brown v. Wyman, 224 Mich. 360, 195 N.W. 52 (1923)

20
21
22
23

and Fleming v.

Gemein, 168 Mich. 541, 134 N.W. 969 (1912). Of interest also is Bradwell v. Railway Co., 139 Pa. 404, 20 Atl. 1046 (1891) where the verdict
was for "61/2 cents."
Miller v. Miller, 81 Kan. 397, 105 Pac. 544 (1909) and Snyder v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 107 Ore. 673, 215 Pac. 887 (1923).
McLean v. Sanders, 139 Ore. 144, 7 P.2d 981 (1932) and Fischer v.
Howard, supra note 38, Klein v. Miller, 159 Ore. 27, 77 P.2d 1103 (1938).
Keicher v. Michaal, 196 Wis. 305, 220 N.W. 179 (1928) and Malden
Trust Co. v. Perlmuter, 278 Mass. 259, 179 N.E. 631 (1932).
Snyder v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 107 Ore. 673, 215 Pac. 887
(1923) and cases cited therein.
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done so if the verdict had "in form" been for defendant. 24 The
jury's error, in other words, is presumed to be one of expression
rather than from a mistake or from any doubt that defendant
was not liable. This is obviously designed to permit defendant
the advantage of what in all probability represents a finding in
his behalf on liability, to save the expense of a new trial and to
prevent plaintiff from getting a second bite at the apple. Although this theory appears to be the majority rule throughout
the states it should be noted that state appellate courts often base
their decisions on a variety of reasons such as whether or not
the evidence concerning liability preponderates in favor of plaintiff or defendant or whether it is evenly balanced. The extent
to which these distinctions are 2recognized within each jurisdiction
will be discussed subsequently. 5
Giving even more force to the majority rule is the unlikelihood that twelve jurors, after deciding that defendant was liable,
would, apart from some highly unusual circumstances, then award
but nominal damages. A further argument for calling such a
verdict one in favor of defendant is that a nominal verdict could
not often be the result of a compromise as it would exhibit a
virtually complete defeat for the pro-plaintiff forces. Assuming
that there are such pro-plaintiff forces a nominal verdict would
seem highly unlikely. These presumptions should also be equally
applicable in support of the view that verdicts for "none" or no"l
damages should be construed as verdicts for defendant. However,
there is a sharp division of opinion on this last point due mainly
to judicial interpretations of statutes providing that "where the
jury find for plaintiff they must also assess the amount of his
damages.120 These opinions are so anomolous that in the case of
at least one jurisdiction it is held a reversible abuse of discretion
for the trial judge to set aside a nominal verdict of $1.00 and to
refuse to do so where the verdict is for "none" damages, though
the difference, as the distinguished dissenting judge pointed out,
is "only $1.00.1127

v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., 191 Iowa 692, 182 N.W. 865
(1921), Haney v. Cheatham, 8 Wash.2d 310, 11 P.2d 1003 (1941) and

214Rubinson

Snyder v. Portland Ry., Light &
25

Power Co., Supra, note 23.

Infra, page 708.
(1919) based on § 5-405,
O.C.L.A., OREGON REV. STAT. 17.425 (formerly § 2-405 Oregon

20 Goyne v. Tracy, 94 Ore. 216, 185 P. 584

Code of 1930) and McLean v. Sanders, 139 Ore. 144, 7 P.2d 981
(1932).
27

Klein v. Miller, 159 Ore. 27, 77 P.2d 1103, 1108 (1938) where Judge
Rossman, in dissent, stated: "The difference is not one of principle-

THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
It must be emphasized, however, that a nominal verdict must,
under some circumstances, be set aside even in jurisdictions employing the rule that such a verdict is a perversely-expressed
finding for the defendant. This is the case whenever plaintiff
would have been entitled to a new trial if the verdict had "in
form" been for defendant. As a nominal verdict is to be regarded
as a finding for defendant, any other result would be absurd.
Thus, it is uniformally held in these jurisdictions that a nominal
verdict must be set aside and a new trial granted whenever the
evidence as to defendant's liability preponderates in plaintiff's
favor such that plaintiff would have been entitled to a new trial
had the jury "formally" found for defendant. 2s However, these
cases do not yet make it clear whether plaintiff is entitled to a
new trial as a matter of law or whether his right to receive one
rests in the exercise of the trial court's discretion.
In marked contrast to the view that a nominal verdict is a
verdict for defendant a second group of cases holds firmly to the
technical and unrealistic position that such a verdict conclusively
establishes the liability of the defendant. Under this view a nominal verdict must be set aside on plaintiff's motion even where the
evidence as to defendant's liability preponderates in defendant's
favor. 29 The basis for these holdings is that a nominal verdict
is "perverse" and "farsical" and would, if allowed to stand, denature the law and encourage irresponsibility on the part of
jurors.3 0 Ignored is the injustice done to defendant and the fact
that the very "perverseness" relied upon to set aside the verdict
rests on the notion that the jury actually found for plaintiff and
then arbitrarily refused to award substantial damages. As althe difference is $1." It should be noted, however, that Klein v.
Miller was reversed, in part, by Fischer v. Howard, 201 Ore. 426,
271 P.2d 1059 (1954), although it is not readily apparent which part
of the Klein opinion was actually over-ruled. Those jurisdictions which
hold that a verdict for "none dollars" is also a finding for the defendant are represented by the frequently cited case of Royal Indemnity Co. v. Island Lake Tp., 177 Minn. 408, 225 N.W. 291 (1929).
28

29

30

Dowd v. Westinghouse Air-Brake Co., 132 Mo. 579, 34 S.W. 493 (1896).
Haven v. Missouri Ry. Co., 155 Mo. 216, 55 S.W. 1035 (1900) and
cases cited in note 24 supra. All recognize the principle that a new
trial will be granted where plaintiff would have been entitled to a
new trial had the jury formally found for defendant.
Chouquette v. Southern Elect. R. Co., 152 Mo. 257, 53 S.W. 897 (1899);
Bracken v. Champlin, 114 Kan. 882, 220 Pac. 1027 (1927); DeMoss v.
Brown Cab. Co., 218 Iowa 77, 254 N.W. 17 (1934) and Cosgrove v.
Fogg, 152 Me. 464, 54 A.2d 538 (1947).
Brown v. Wyman, 224 Mich. 360, 195 N.W. 52 (1923).
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ready mentioned, this is almost never the case and such verdict
is, in fact, probably a finding for the defendant combined with a
method to relieve plaintiff of paying the costs. The perverse
conduct involved in the nominal verdict situation seems to be
much less than that involved in the typical substantial though
inadequate verdict case where damages are reduced because of
doubts over defendant's liability. Furthermore, a few jurisdictions
have gone so far as to take the view that while a trial judge may
ordinarily refuse to allow a new trial in the substantial though
inadequate case, such refusal in the nominal verdict case constitutes a reversible abuse of discretion.3 1 The jury in the former
situation is regarded as having "honestly" compromised their
doubts or differences over defendant's liability, while, in the latter,
of finding for plaintiff and then "dishonestly" and "perversely"
refusing to award substantial damages. If either verdict is allowed to stand it should, most certainly, be the latter.
A third group of nominal verdict cases holds that the granting
or refusal of plaintiff's motion for a new trial is a matter almost
entirely within the discretion of the trial court.3 2 The trial court
is left to determine whether the verdict is a perversely-expressed
finding for the defendant or a finding for plaintiff with an arbitrary
refusal to award damages. This is particularly true where the
evidence as to defendant's liability is evenly balanced, or, as some
of these courts have said, "conflicting," such that a verdict for
either litigant would be supported by "substantial evidence". 33
Significantly, however, even in this situation most of the cases have
arisen out of the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial rather
than where a new trial has been granted. Authority can be mar31 See Meier v. Bridgeport Irrig. Dist, 113 Neb. 344, 203 N.W. 543 (1925)

where a $1 verdict was set aside and McGrew Mach. Co. v. One
Spring Alarm Clock Co. 124 Neb. 93, 245 N.W. 263 (1932) where a
$1000 verdict, probably the result of a compromise, did not warrant
a new trial. In Sellers v. Mann, 113 Ga. 643, 39 S.E. 11 (1901) a new
trial was ordered where the verdict was merely for "nominal damages" and Cox v. Nix, 87 Ga. App. 837, 75 S.W.2d 331 (1953) where
the plaintiff suffered a miscarriage and was still under doctor's care
one year after the accident. The verdict of $200 was not set aside.
However, it should be noted that Georgia is a comparative negligence
jurisdiction.
32

33

Davis v. Whitmore, 43 Ariz. 453, 32 P.2d 340 (1934); Sullivan v. Wilson, 283 S.W. 743 (Mo. App. 1926); Fischer v. City of St. Louis, 189
Mo. 567, 88 S.W. 82 (1905).
Sullivan v. Wilson, 283 S.W. 743 (Mo. App. 1926) and Fischer v.
City of St. Louis, 189 Mo. 567, 88 S.W. 82 (1905). (Nominal verdict
set aside).
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shalled in support of the general proposition that the trial court
always has much more discretion in granting than in refusing a
new trial.3 4 The very important question of what constitutes an
"abuse of discretion" is seldom discussed. Presumably, however,
a trial judge would not be allowed to grant a new trial where the
evidence as to liability preponderates for defendant, 3 5 or conversely, deny a new trial where the evidence preponderates for
plaintiff.3 6
The fourth and last group of nominal verdict cases is distinguished by a failure to follow any consistent policy. The cases in
Iowa, 37 for example, are irreconciably in conflict, sometimes following the rule that a nominal verdict must be regarded as a verdict for the defendant and sometimes discarding it in favor of the
policy that the granting or refusing of a new trial is discretionary
38
with the trial court. The Iowa court in Mendenhall v. Struck,
for example, after citing a host of indistinguishable cases to the
effect that a nominal verdict must be regarded as a verdict for defendant, noted, without explanation, that "(a) 'no damage' verdict
cannot be viewed as a verdict for naminal damages," 39 and accordingly refused to do so.
Two important questions remain to be discussed: (1) whether,
when a nominal verdict is set aside, the new trial may, under some
circumstances, properly be confined to the question of damages
alone; and (2) how it is to be determined, in those cases where the
verdict is for more than a few dollars, whether it is for nominal or
substantial damages and which rules should be applied.
The first question may be disposed of briefly for there is no
indication in any of the cases that the question of a partial new
trial depends other than upon the principles which apply when

34

Gilbert v. Kinnaird, 229 Iowa 141, 294 N.W. 272 (1940).

35

Haffner v. Cross, 116 W. Va. 562, 182 S.E. 573 (1935)

36

verdict for $25.
Cochran v. Mitchem, 143 Ga. 35, 84 S.E. 127 (1915), Snyder v. Port-

which was a

land Ry., Light & Power Co., 107 Ore. 673, 215 Pac. 887 (1923)
Rawle v. McIllhenny, 163 Va. 735, 177 S.E. 215, 221 (1934).

and

37

Ruby v. Lawson, 182 Iowa 1156, 166 N.W. 481 (1918), Cogley v. Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. Co., 185 Iowa 1080, 171 N.W. 745 (1919) where the dissenting justice discussed the irreconcilable conflict between the Ruby
and Cogley decisions. See also: Rubinson v. Des Moines City Ry. Co.,

38

Mendenhall v. Struck, 207 Iowa 1094, 224 N.W. 95 (1929).
Id. 224 N.W. 98.

191 Iowa 692, 182 N.W. 865 (1921).
39
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the verdict is for substantial though inadequate damages. Courts
adhering to the view that a nominal verdict conclusively establishes the liability of the defendant, for the purposes of determining whether plaintiff is entitled to a complete new trial, have occasionally granted a new trial confined solely to the question of
damages. 40 However, the question of a new trial on the issue of
damages alone will be discussed in substantial detail in another
portion of this paper.
The question of whether a particular verdict is nominal or
substantial though inadequate presents a much greater problem.
Those cases which raise and discuss the question of whether particular inadequate verdicts are for "substantial" or "nominal"
damages are, to say the least, conflicting. In some jurisdictions,
where both kinds of verdicts are regarded as automatically entitling
plaintiff to a new trial, the question is immaterial. However, this
question must be occasionally met and decided.
The term "nominal verdict" has ordinarily been used with
reference to any inadequate verdict which is so inadequate with
regard to the evidence as to plaintiff's damages as to show that
no attempt whatever was made to assess damages. It is not unexpected that a few decisions may characterize obviously substantial verdicts as nominal while others hold obviously nominal verdicts to be substantial. 41 However, the substantial though inadequate verdict usually results where it is clear, upon the record,
that the evidence concerning the defendant's liability is conflicting
and in doubt thus giving rise to an inference that a compromise
resulted. A further analysis of just what is meant by a substantial
though inadequate verdict will be included in the separate section
discussing that subject.
There is, of course, sometimes room for legitimate difference
of opinion over whether a given inadequate verdict is "substantial"
or "nominal.14 2 But such cases have arisen only infrequently and

40
41

42

Bracken v. Champlin 114 Kan. 882, 220 P.1027 (1923), and Cosgrove
v. Fogg, 152 Me. 464, 54 A.2d 538 (1947). See discussion in section V.
Price v. McCormish, 22 Colo. App.2d 92, 70 P.2d 978 (1937) where
the court held $200 to be substantial and stated that nominal damages
could only be "a penny, 1 cent, 6 cents." See note 42 for related
cases.
See Batt v. Earle, 164 App. Div. 228, 149 N.Y.S. 623 (1914) and Corn
Novelty Co. Inc. v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc., Ltd., 176 App. Div.
261, N.Y.S. 1020 (1917) where the verdicts were for $100 each, but
even here the courts had no difficulty interpreting the verdicts as
nominal in each case.
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afford no basis for thinking that the distinction between nominal
and substantial verdicts is either unworkably uncertain or produces an unjustifiable amount of litigation. In doubtful cases,
however, it would seem that the verdict should be regarded as
"substantial" in order not to deprive plaintiff of the possibility of
securing a new trial in accordance with the rules pertaining to
substantial though inadequate verdicts.
B.

SUBSTANTIAL THOUGH INADEQUATE VERDICTS

As in the discussion of the nominal verdicts the following
analysis will be limited to state court decisions on the subject and
to cases where the motion for new trial due to inadequate damages
contemplates only a complete new trial. The question of inadequate verdicts within the federal judicial system will be discussed
subsequently as will the problem of partial new trials confined to
the question of damages alone.
1.
The first and perhaps the most basic distinction in the substantial though inadequate verdict case law hinges on whether
plaintiff or defendant is moving for the complete new trial. Where
defendant is the moving party, the vast majority of cases have held
that relief must automatically be denied, 43 assuming of course that
defendant would not otherwise be entitled to a new trial-on the
ground, for example, that the verdict was manifestly contrary to
the weight of the evidence on the question of liability. This almost universal refusal to grant relief rests on the obviously unrealistic assumption that the jury's verdict for plaintiff conclusively establishes defendant's liability and that the inadequacy of
the verdict, therefore, prejudices only plaintiff and is harmless
error to defendant. 44 As a matter of fact, of course, defendant
typically has been prejudiced. He has been deprived of a clearcut decision on the question of liability. As noted above, 45 the
typical substantial though inadequate verdict involves an illicit
43 Mills v. Rose, 166 Va. 572, 175 S.E. 230 (1934), Billow v. Billow, 360
Pa. 343 61 A.2d 817 (1948), and Fleming v. DeWitt, 41 Wash.2d 454,
249 P.2d 776 (1952).
44 Mills v. Rose, 166 Va. 572, 595, 175 S.E. 230, 240 (1934) which stated:

"The general rule is that in a personal injury case a verdict against
a defendant will not be set aside on his motion on the ground that
the damages awarded are less than the plaintiff was entitled to on
the evidence. The rationale of the rule is that the defendant could
not have been damaged by such a verdict."

45 Supra page 700.
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compounding of liability and damage questions and assuming that
there is no other apparent explanation for the inadequacy-a simple
mathematical error by the jury, for example-all substantial
though inadequate verdicts should be presumed to represent illicit
compromise verdicts.
This is not to say, however, that a defendant suffering a substantial though inadequate verdict against him should therefore
automatically be granted relief. As will be discussed subsequently,
this should ordinarily depend on the state of the evidence on the
question of liability. However, there is absolutely no reason for
the court's automatic refusal of relief to defendants. A defendant's right to a new trial for inadequacy of the verdict should be
governed by the same rules as govern plaintiff's right to a new trial
on this ground. Thus far, however, only a few jurisdictions have
recognized this and 46even they appear to have done so with considerable hesitation.
2.
Let us now turn to the more common situation where plaintiff
rather than defendant requests a complete new trial for inadequacy
of the verdict. In these cases the courts have usually aligned themselves with one of two basic theories. The first is that plaintiff is
automatically entitled to a new trial as a matter of right simply
upon showing that the verdict is substantial though inadequate.
The second basic view makes plaintiff's right to relief depend on
a judicial examination of the evidence relative to defendant's liability. The "no examination of the evidence" cases will be discussed
first.
a. Where No Examination of Evidence is Made
If the jury's verdict in his behalf, though for substantial damages, is nonetheless inadequate or "clearly inadequate," a substantial minority of courts have held that plaintiff is entitled to a new
trial as a matter of right.4 7 The trial court, in other words, has
little or no discretion to deny plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
And this is true irrespective of what is likely to have caused the
inadequacy, the only qualification being that plaintiff is not him-

46
47

Bressler v. McVey, 82 Kan. 341, 108 P. 97 (1910), Schever v. Manashaw, 77 Misc. 208, 137 N.Y.S. 534 (1912).
Foster v. Dukes, 301 Ky. 752, 193 S.W.2d 159 (1946); Sherer v. Smith,
85 Ohio App. 317, 88 N.E.2d 424 (1949); Hauk v. Zimmerman, 135
Conn. 259, 63 A.2d 146 (1948); Paustenbaugh v. Ward Baking Co.,
374 Pa. 418, 97 A.2d 816 (1953).
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self responsible, as for example, by requesting or acquiescing in
erroneous instructions as to damages. 48 Thus, substantial though
inadequate verdicts seemingly produced by juror prejudice against
plaintiff or sympathy for defendant, by a mistake, or through a
misapprehension of the issues stand on the same footing as those
which can justifiably only be explained in terms of juror doubt
over defendant's liability. For the purpose of determining whether
plaintiff is entitled to a new trial, the jury's verdict is always regarded as conclusively settling the liability of the defendant and
no examination of the evidence bearing upon this issue is made.
While a few courts have said that "passion and prejudice," 49
rather than "mere inadequacy" is the basis for relief, this is true
only in the strained technical sense that a substantial though inadequate verdict is conclusively presumed to have resulted from
passion and prejudice5 ° and that relief will always formally be
rested upon this ground. In view of this presumption the actual
cause of the jury's action is treated as immaterial and the end result is the same, i.e., plaintiff gets a new trial upon showing that
the verdict is substantial though inadequate. This seems to be
the case even where the courts use such tests as "grossly inadequate,"5' 1 "inadequate so as to shock one's conscience, ' '52 "palpably
inadequate,"53 "manifestly too small, ' 5 -" "incommensurate with substantial justice,"''
and clearly inadequate." 56 From a careful
reading of the cases it is apparent that, although each jurisdiction
prefers to use its own terminology, the real test seems to be that
Linitzky v. Gorman, 146 N.Y.S. 313 (1914).
49 Cesario v. Demetria Realty Corp., 250 App. Div. 272, 294 N.Y.S. 26
(1937), and Coward v. Ruckert, 381 Pa. 388, 113 A.2d 287 (1955).
5o State ex reZ. State Highway Com. v. Liddle, 193 S.W.2d 625 (Mo.
App. 1946).
51 Dusckiewicz v. Carter, 115 Vt. 122, 52 A.2d 788 (1947).
52 Glasser v. Leary, 67 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1953).
53 McSee v. Chicago Motor Coach Co., 342 IIl. App. 238, 96 N.E.2d 381
(1950).
54 Flournoy v. Brown, 200 Miss. 171, 26 So.2d 351 (1946) and Lehrer v.
Lorenzen, 124 Colo. 17, 233 P.2d 382 (1951).
55 Olson v. Thompson, 74 N.W.2d 432 (N.D. 1956).
56 Nebraska persists in refusing to carefully examine the evidence on
liability and a new trial will be granted where the evidence is clearly
inadequate. Mares v. Chaloupka, 110 Neb. 199, 192 N.W. 397 (1923);
Meier v. Bridgeport Irrig. Dist. 113 Neb. 344, 203 N.W. 543 (1925);
Preston v. Farmers 1rrig. Dist. 134 Neb. 503, 289 N.W. 336 (1938);
Harper v. Young, 139 Neb. 624, 298 N.W. 342 (1941); Consumers Co48

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 39, 1960
a new trial should be granted where there is a showing that the
verdict is substantial though inadequate. Even in jurisdictions
employing the "passion and prejudice" test it is readily acknowledged that passion and
prejudice may be inferred from an inade7
quate verdict alone.5
There is, of course, no justifiable basis upon which the propriety of granting plaintiff a new trial can ever be challenged in
those cases where the verdict's inadequacy results from mistake,
caprice, sympathy or prejudice.5s Indeed, at least where no other
form of relief is available, any other course would be intolerable.
But these are the extraordinary situations. The typical case, as
every trial judge and lawyer knows, is where the jury, or some one
of them, entertained substantial doubts over defendant's liability
and accordingly reduced plaintiff's damages either as a means of
compensating, or atoning, for such doubts, or of resolving their
basic differences over defendant's liability. There is, then, usually
some question as to whether plaintiff was actually prejudiced by
the verdict and whether his chances for a substantial increase are
great enough to warrant the new trial. Recognizing this, a number
of the jurisdictions make a detailed examination of the strength
of plaintiff's showing as to defendant's liability. The right of a
plaintiff, or defendant, to have a verdict for plaintiff set aside over
the objection of the other party, does not, and should not, depend
solely upon the evidence bearing upon the damage issue. The
rules formulated by that class of cases which seek to make some
examination of the evidence will now be discussed.
b. Where the Evidence is Examined
Both the apparent cause for the return of an inadequate verdict and the state of the evidence relative to the liability of the
defendant have an important, and to a considerable extent interacting, bearing upon plaintiff's right to have a verdict set aside

op Ass'n v. Sherman, 147 Neb. 901, 25 N.W.2d 548 (1947); Ambrozi
v. Fry, 158 Neb. 18, 62 N.W.2d 259 (1954); Schumacher v. Lang, 160

Neb. 43, 68 N.W.2d 892 (1955), and Dixon v. Coffey, 161 Neb. 487,
73 N.W.2d 660 (1955). This list represents all inadequate verdict cases
decided in Nebraska and not once has there been a departure from
the clearly inadequate test.
57 State ex rel. State Highway Comm. v. Liddle, 193 S.W.2d 625 (Mo.
App. 1946) and Quirk v. City and County of San Francisco, 105 Cal.
App.2d 893, 232 P.2d 893 (1951).

58 Blincoe v. Drury, 311 Ky. 613, 224 S.W.2d 936 (1949) and others too
numerous to require mention.
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for inadequacy. 5 9 As noted above, 60 state appellate courts have
established fairly definite and exacting rules governing the situations in which motions for new trial based upon inadequacy of
the verdict must be granted. Although these rules are by no means
uniform throughout the states, state trial judges do have definite
directives upon which to base their decisions. Generally speaking,
these directives, in jurisdictions requiring a judicial examination
of the liability evidence, are formulated in terms of four basic situations:
(1) where the evidence preponderates so heavily for defendant that he was entitled to a directed verdict; (2) where the
evidence "merely" preponderates for defendant though there is
sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that defendant
is liable; (3) where the evidence is "even" or "conflicting" and
there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict in favor of either
plaintiff or defendant; and (4) where the evidence clearly preponderates in favor of plaintiff though there is sufficient evidence
to support a verdict finding defendant not liable. Each of these
classes of cases will now be discussed separately.
1.

Where defendant should have been entitled to a directed verdict

In these cases the evidence is insufficient to support plaintiff's
verdict and a directed verdict for defendant should have been
granted. And in such cases it is held with virtual unanimity that
it is reversible error for the trial court to grant plaintiff's motion.0 1
The reason for this, of course, is obvious. Plaintiff cannot be prejudiced by the smallness of the verdict in his favor for he is actually
entitled to nothing. Where defendant acquieses in such a verdict
plaintiff can hardly complain.
2.

Where the evidence merely preponderatesfor defendant

The second class of cases arises where the evidence preponderates for defendant although there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant is liable. Here the
preponderance, while in favor of defendant, is not such as to have
entitled him to a directed verdict. Again, the vast majority of
cases apply a harmless error theory and hold that a trial court

59 Rawle v. Mcfllhenny, 163 Va. 735, 177 S.E. 214 (1934).
60 Supra page 707.
61 Maki v. St. Lukes Hosp. Ass'n, 122 Minn. 444, 142 N.W. 705 (1913);
Adams v. Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co., 127 Wash. 678, 221 P.
993 (1924); Evans v. Yakima Valley Transp. Co., 39 Wash.2d 841,
239 P.2d 336 (1952).
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order granting plaintiff's motion for new trial is a reversible abuse
of discretion. 2 The plaintiff is said to have fared as well as possible
because of the decided preponderance of the evidence in defendant's favor. There seems to be no doubt that this is also a proper
result where defendant acquieses.
It should be noted that the refusal to allow a new trial to plaintiff where the liability evidence preponderates for defendant does
not do violence to the principle that liability and damage issues are
to be kept apart. The rationale of these decisions is simply that
the inadequacy of the verdict was "harmless error" to the plaintiff,
as he was not properly entitled to anything. Also, the chance that
another jury might award plaintiff a verdict in line with the evidence on damages is outweighed by the expense involved and by
the fact that substantial justice had been done.63 The analogy is
to the line of decisions where, though defendant is entitled to a
directed verdict, the case is nonetheless improperly allowed to go
to the jury which returns an inadequate verdict. In these6 4 cases, as
already mentioned, plaintiff is universally denied relief.
3.

Where the evidence is conflicting

In this class of cases there is sufficient evidence to support a
verdict in favor of either plaintiff or defendant although there is
no clear preponderance of the evidence in favor of either party.
It is at this point that the courts begin granting plaintiff's motion
for new trial. Where the verdict is clearly for substantial though
inadequate damages there seems to be no valid reason for refusing
the motion.0 5 Such a verdict cannot, upon any reasonable theory,
be considered a holding for defendant as in the nominal verdict
cases and the probability is that the jury has illicitly compromised.
In this sort of case it should be error to refuse a new trial based
upon inadequate damages.
In some jurisdictions, however, plaintiff's right to a new trial
where the liability evidence is evenly balanced or, as the rule is

62

63

Hubbard v. Mason City, 64 Iowa 245, 20 N.W. 172 (1884); Young v.
Great Northern Ry. Co., 80 Minn. 123, 83 N.W. 32 (1900); McDowell
v. City of Portsmouth, 184 Va. 548, 35 S.E.2d 821 (1945).
Norland v. Peterson, 169 Wash. 380, 13 P.2d 483 (1932) and Isley v.
McClandish, 299 Ill. App. 564, 20 N.E.2d 890 (1939).

Supra note 61.
65 Stone v. Turner, 178 Iowa 561, 159 N.W. 989 (1916); Lilly v. Eberhardt,
37 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. 1931); Bencich v. Market St. Ry. Co., 20 Cal. App.
2d 518, 67 P.2d 398 (1937).
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sometimes stated, "conflicting or not free from doubt" is left en-

tirely within the discretion of the trial court.06 Under this view
a trial court ruling either way will rarely ever be disturbed. A
distinction is drawn between such cases and cases where liability is
conceded or where the evidence relating-thereto preponderates in
favor of plaintiff.67 In these instances plaintiff's right to a new
trial is almost absolute. The rationale for the distinction, while
omitted in the cases, is unmistakable. In the last named instances,
the probability is that the jury was actuated either by prejudice
against plaintiff or sympathy for defendant. In the "conflicting
or not free from doubt" cases, however, the inadequacy can usually
only be explained in terms of juror doubt over defendant's liability,
or, as the matter is ordinarily put, as a "compromise."
The next step in the reasoning of the courts following the above
view is that "compromise verdicts," or at least those which have
been sanctioned by the trial judge, should not lightly be set aside.
This argument has several branches, one of which is that a trial
judge has the power to uphold the time-honored right of a jury
to render a compromise verdict and to sustain a verdict which is
substantial. This simply begs the entire question. The second
argument is that the granting of a new trial to plaintiff would just
as likely constitute an act of injustice to defendant rather than one
of justice to plaintiff and that in such event it can no more reasonably be said that the plaintiff recovered too little than that he
should not have recovered at all. This also begs the question and
is, again, merely another way of saying that compromise verdicts
are all right and that plaintiff should be satisfied with what was
given him, notwithstanding that neither liability or damage questions were properly adjudicated.
A final argument might be made to the effect that since juries
very often compromise where the evidence concerning liability is
conflicting and since they necessarily do so in most cases without
detection, (because of the strict rules on impeachment of the verdict),68 it makes little sense to set their compromises aside when
the fact of compromise appears from the face of the verdict itself.
But this is an obviously defective argument. In the first place,
66 Paustenbaugh v. Ward Baking Co., 374 Pa. 418, 97 A.2d 816 (1953).
67 Fitzgerald v. Penn. Transit Co., 353 Pa. 43, 44 A.2d 288 (1945)
and
Coward v. Rucker, 381 Pa. 388, 112 A.2d 287 (1955).
68 Norton v. Hickingbottom, 212 Ark. 581, 206 S.W.2d 777 (1947); Kennedy v. Stocker, 116 Vt. 98, 70 A.2d 587 (1950); Clark v. Bradley,
106 Cal. App.2d 537, 235 P.2d 439 (1951); Schumacher v. Lang, 160
Neb. 43, 68 N.W.2d 892 (1955).
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the substantial though inadequate compromise verdict will usually
be far more prejudicial to plaintiff than a compromise verdict
which cannot be detected and, second, juries do not always or
perhaps even usually render compromise verdicts even in the area
where they can do so without detection. Finally, refusal to set a
compromise verdict aside in the only type of case where it is possible to do so makes a hallow mockery of the principle that
liability and damages are to be kept apart and results in nonconformity in the administration of justice.
4. Where the evidence preponderates for pZaintiff
Where liability is conceded 9 or where the evidence on such
issue preponderates for plaintiff,70 he is generally held entitled to
a new trial as a matter of right just as in those jurisdictions which
refuse to examine the state of the evidence as to liability and who
regard the cause of the verdict's inadequacy as immaterial. The
reason for this is apparent. Whatever the cause of the inadequacy,
plaintiff has received less than the sum to which he is minimally
entitled and relief cannot justifiably be refused on a theory of
"harmless error." If liability is conceded plaintiff will unquestionably receive a larger recovery on retrial and this is also highly
probable where the evidence on such issue preponderates in plaintiff's favor. An inadequate verdict, where a verdict for defendant
is clearly improper, generally results from sympathy for defendant,
prejudice against plaintiff, or from a mistake. Of course, where
the eveidence as to liability is evenly balanced, the jurors have
probably in most cases reduced damages as a means of compromising their differences over defendant's liability or to compensate
for their doubts on this question. But here, unlike the situation
where the evidence as to liability preponderates for defendant,
plaintiff has a better than even chance of securing a proper
verdict on re-trial. Relief cannot be denied without sanctioning
the very practice giving rise to the verdict's inadequacy and depriving plaintiff of the right to have defendant's liability adjudicated without reference to the question of damages.
09 Morton Lumber Co. v. Gaynor Lumber Co., 197 Iowa 308, 196 N.W.
1018 (1924), Taylor v. Rodriquez, 10 Cal. App.2d 608, 52 P.2d 494
(1936), Montgomery v. Simon, 309 Il. App. 516, 33 N.E.2d 642 (1941),
and Torrence v. Sharp, 246 Iowa 460, 68 N.W.2d 85 (1955).
70 Whitney v. Milwaukee, 65 Wis. 409, 27 N.W. 39 (1886), Fleming v.
Gemein, 168 Mich. 541, 134 N.W. 969 (1912), Cochran v. Mitchem,
27 Ga. 358, 84 S.E. 127 (1915), Howell v. Murdock, 156 Va. 669, 158
S.E. 886 (1931), and Swanson v. Sewall, 183 Wash. 462, 48 P.2d 939
(1935).
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IV.

FEDERAL LAW

An examination of the Federal Law has been saved until this
point because of the marked disparity between it and the state
court rules governing inadequate verdicts. As is obvious from
what has been discussed, state appellate courts have, rightly or
wrongly, formulated a definite set of rules to govern the handling
of inadequate verdicts by state trial judges. Federal appellate
courts, on the other hand, have to this day steadfastly refused to
interfere with a decision of a federal district judge granting a new
trial for inadequacy of the verdict. Traditionally, of course, federal district judges have been and still are vested with the dis71
cretionary power to grant new trials "in the interest of justice" '
and it is difficult to imagine any inadequate verdict case, whether
involving a nominal or substantial though inadequate verdict,
where the ruling of the federal district judge granting a new trial
would be reversed on appeal as an abuse of discretion. Certainly
no case can be found in which such a holding was ever made. The
problem, then, in so far as the federal system is concerned, is to
review those situations in which federal appellate courts may lawfully reverse a federal district judge for refusing to grant a new
trial for inadequacy of the verdict.
Historically, apart from certain exceptions later to be noted,
federal appellate courts have refused to review the order of a federal district judge denying a new trial for inadequacy of the verdict.7 2 Such refusal has been put on several grounds, among them
the 7th Amendment, 3 a provision of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789 precluding a review for "errors of fact,174 and upon the ground
of stare decisis. The federal constitutional point, however, appears
never to have been taken very seriously and the Judiciary Act
point, for what it was ever worth, would seem forever to have been
71

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1941),

Daffinrud v. U. S., 145 F.2d 724 (7th Cir. 1944), Benjamin v. Lehigh
Valley R. Co., 10 F.R.D. 154 (D.C.N.Y. 1950) and Charles v. Norfolk
& W. Ry. Co., 188 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1951).
72 Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24 (1879) and Wilson v. Everts,
139 U. S. 616 (1890).
73 Article 3, Section 2, of the original Constitution conferred upon the
Supreme Court "appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with
such exception and under such regulations as the Congress shall
make." It was felt that this provision endangered the right of trial
by jury as it existed at common law and the Seventh Amendment
resulted. See Parson v. Bedford, 3 Pet. (28 U. S.) 433 (1830) and
Metropolitan R. Co. v. Moore, 121 U. S. 558, 573 (1887).
74 See § 22 of the Judicial Code of 1789, 1 Stat. 85 (1789).
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laid to rest by a 1948 enactment allowing federal appellate courts
to reverse, affirm or modify and enter any judgment whch should
have been entered in the trial court 75 As will be pointed out later,
federal appellate courts have been free to reverse rulings of federal
district judges denying new trials for the excessiveness of the verdict and no reason appears apart from stare decisis which would
indicate that any different rule should be followed in the area of
inadequate verdicts.
The problem then appears to be one of stare decisis and particularly of the meaning of the Supreme Court's inadequate verdict
decision in Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 76 decided
in 1933. This was an action by the seller to recover damages for
the buyer's refusal to accept certain coal deliveries and the evidence established that the highest market price of such coal
throughout the delivery period was materially less than the contract price and that seller was entitled to a verdict in excess of
$18,000 if entitled to anything. The jury returned a general verdict
for seller but awarded only $1.00 as damages. The Court, by Justice
77
Brandeis over a vigorous dissent by Justices Stone and Cardoza,
refused to upset the trial judge's ruling denying plaintiff's motion
for a new trial. Because of its obvious importance to the development of the law of inadequate verdicts, the Court's opinion is considered here at some length.
The opinion, so far as it relates to the inadequate verdict feature of the case, divides into three parts. The first part is devoted
to a consideration of seller's contention that review must be denied
because of the ancient rule, originally considered to be without
exception and employed as the sole justification for denying review
in the Court's earlier inadequate verdict cases, that neither the
Circuit Courts of Appeal nor the Supreme Court will "review the
action of a federal trial court in granting or denying a motion for
a new trial for error of fact."7
This contention was flatly rejected.
Justice Brandeis relied on two grounds: first, the disappearance
of the statutory basis and the invalidity of the constitutional
grounds upon which the rule had been formerly rested; and, second,
the existence of numerous cases outside the inadequate verdict

75

70
77
78

See § 2106 of the Judicial Code of 1948, 62 Stat. 963 (1948), which
omitted the words ". . . or for any error of fact."
Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U. S. 474 (1933).
Id. at page 486.
Id. at page 481 where the Court cites Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S.
24, 31 (1879) and Lincoln v. Power, 151 U. S. 436, 438 (1894).
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area in which review had in fact been granted and the trial court's
ruling set aside. The rule had atrophied since the early days and
its application was no longer to be taken for granted. Review
would in future depend on the facts of the individual case. It became necessary to determine "whether the circumstances of the
case at bar justify an enquiry [sic] into the trial court's refusal
79
to set aside the verdict."
The second branch of the opinion considers buyer's contention
that the no review for error of fact rule should be held inapplicable
by the time-honored method of turning a question of fact into an
issue of law. Specifically, buyer argued that the verdict was "inconsistent on its fact" and that refusal to set it aside presented an
issue of law. Apparently conceding the validity of buyer's argument in cases where the award "exceeded a statutory limit" (or
presumably, was less than a statutory minimum), or "less than an
amount undisputed," or "in clear contravention of the instructions
of the trial court," it could not be accepted in a case such as Fairmount where the trial judge could reasonably have regarded the
verdict as a "finding for the defendant," and there was no indication in the record that he did not.80 This was because "appellate
courts should be slow to impute to juries a disregard of their duties,
and to trial courts a want of diligence or perspicacity in appaising
the jury's conduct." 8' The evidence as to liability was "conflicting"
and the jury may have found for defendant but simply wished the
costs to be taxed against the defendant. In other words, the Court
would presume that a verdict for nominal damages where substantial damages or a verdict for defendant was technically required
was, in effect, a verdict for defendant and had been so regarded
by the trial court. It should be noted, however, that the Court
failed to examine what the preponderance of the evidence showed
as to liability, remarking only that the evidence as to liability was
"conflicting."
A remaining point of significance lies in the Court's failure to
specifically discuss why Fairmount was to be excluded from the
class of cases where the jury's verdict was returned in "clear contravention" of the trial court's instructions and where review
might be had for error of law in the event a new trial was denied,
Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U. S. 474, 483
(1933).
80 Id. at pages 483 and 484. These exceptions will all be discussed in
detail subsequently.
8s 287 U. S. at 485.
79
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a point heavily relied upon by the dissenting justices.8 2 Apparently,
the majority felt that a verdict for nominal damages which could
be interpreted as a de facto verdict for defendant was not a "clear"
violation, at least in the absence of a specific instruction by the
trial court that a verdict for nominal damages was improper. The
necessity for the qualification arises from the Court's apparent
approval of United Press Assn's v. Nat. Newspapers Ass'n, 3 where
such an instruction had been given and the trial court's ruling
denying a new trial was reversed.
The final and weakest branch of the opinion disposes of buyer's
contention that even if a question of fact rather than an issue of
law be presented, the trial court's refusal to set aside the verdict
constituted an "abuse of discretion" which buyer was entitled to
have reviewed and corrected. Apparently granting that this would
be true if an abuse was shown, "clearly the mere refusal to grant
a new trial where nominal damages were awarded . . . (was) not
an abuse." 4 Presumably, this was thought to be clear because of
what was said in the second branch of the opinion and also because
the Court "frequently refrained from disturbing the trial court's
approval of an award of damages which seemed excessive or inadequate and the circuit courts of appeals (had) generally followed
a similar policy." s r, At this point the Court expressly reserved for
the future the question of "whether refusal to set aside a verdict
for failure to award substantial damages may ever be reviewed on
the ground that the trial judge abused his discretion."8 6
The reservation just noted, coupled with the Court's insistence
that the withered "no review for error of fact" rule can no longer
be invoked as a self-sufficient basis for declining review in cases
where the verdict is attacked as inadequate, but that the circumstances of each case must now be examined, has left the federal
law of inadequate verdicts, so far as review is concerned, in a state
of uncertainty. For Fairmount itself, apart from deciding that
review must be declined where the trial judge could be regarded
as having interpreted a verdict for nominal damages as a de facto
finding for defendant, offers almost no indication of the circum-
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United Press Assn's. v. Nat. Newspapers Ass'n., 254 Fed. 284 (8th Cir.
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1918).
287 U. S. at 485.
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85 Ibid.
b6 Ibid.
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stances under which review will be granted or denied, and the
Court has not had occasion to pass upon the subject since.
The most troublesome ambiguity of Fairmount lies in the
Court's failure to distinguish between inadequate verdict cases of
the type there considered, where the verdict was merely for ncninal damages, and the much more numerous cases where the verdict,
although for substantial damages, is nonetheless inadequate, as in
Railroad Co. v. Fraloff8 7 and Wilson v. Everts,s8 the Court's only
other inadequate verdict cases, decided in 1879 and 1890 respectively. Fraloff was an action to recover the value of certain property lost in transit. The jury's verdict of $10,000 fell short of the
property's value as shown by the evidence by approximately
$65,000. Wilson was an action for breach of an employment contract, the jury's verdict of $10,000 being $5,000 less (or $5,000 more)
than the sum to which plaintiff was entitled according to the evidence, if he was entitled to anything at all. Review of the trial
court's ruling denying a new trial for inadequacy of the verdict
was declined in both cases without discussion, the Court referring
only to the "no review for error of fact" rule, since repudiated as
a general principle in Fairmount. Because of such repudiation and
in view of the heavy reliance in Fairmountupon the circumstance
that the trial judge could there have interpreted the verdict as a
de facto finding for defendant, the question of whether Fraloff and
Wilson are any longer controlling may now fairly be regarded as
open. The substantial though inadequate verdicts which the Court
refused to review, of course, cannot by any stretch of the imagination be interpreted as findings for the defendant and, unlike the
nominal verdict in Fairmount, almost certainly represent illicit
compromises between liability and damages.
Be this as it may, the Circuit Courts of Appeal have generally
taken the view that Fraloff and Wilson are still viable and that
Fairmount is normally to be interpreted as requiring a denial of
review in cases involving "substantial though inadequate" verdicts
as well as in cases where the verdicts are merely nominal. Caloric
Stove Corp. v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co.,89 for example, was an
action for money had and received and the evidence showed that the
jury's award of $28,500 fell short of plaintiff's losses by at least
$3,750 and probably much more. On appeal from the trial court's
87
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Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24 (1879).
Wilson v. Everts, 139 U. S. 616 (1890).
Caloric Stove Corp. v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 205 F.2d 493 (2nd
Cir. 1953).
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denial of plaintiff's motion for a new trial, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, refused
to disturb the judgment, reasoning that "it was less irrational to
award somewhat lower damages than the lowest the evidence
justified, (as in Caloric), than it was to award only nominal damages when substantial damages were the necessary consequence of
a verdict for the plaintiff," 90 as in Fairmount. Since the Supreme
Court had declined review in Fairmount, the substantial though
inadequate verdict in Caloric was a fortiori. Judge Hand also referred to his earlier opinion in Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co.,9 1
which, like Caloric, also involved a substantial though inadequate
verdict, the reference being significant because of Miller's reliance
upon Fraloff and Wilson as requiring a refusal to review. The
notion that the Supreme Court's refusal to review in Fairmount
likewise normally precludes review in substantial though inadequate verdict cases like Caloric also finds support in the holdings
of the Tenth Circuit 92 and of the Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia.93
A contrary view, however, was taken by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Reisberg v. Waters,94 a personal injury action.
The jury's verdict of $1,500 was roughly $750 less than plaintiff's
pecuniary losses and, furthermore, plaintiff had sustained serious
personal injuries. After making pointed mention of the fact that
the jury's verdict was for "substantial" rather than "nominal"
damages, thus avoiding the ratio decidendi of Fairmount,the trial
court's ruling denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial was reversed on the ground "that a verdict in contravention of the instructions of the court may be reversed on appeal as contrary to
law," 95 which Fairmount, as we have seen, expressly, but without explanation, concedes. The Court also drew support from certain language in the Supreme Court's opinion in Dimick v.
Schiedt,90 which succeeds Fairmount by two years, that a "verdict returned by a jury which is palpably and grossly inadequate
90 Id. at 497.

91 Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co., 40 F.2d 463 (2nd Cir. 1930), which
contains an excellent discussion of the problems inherent in this area.
92 Green Construction Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 65 F.2d 852
(10th Cir. 1933).
93 Dean v. Century Motors, 154 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
94 Reisburg v. Walters, 111 F.2d 595 (6th Cr. 1940).
95 Id. at page 598.
90 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474 (1935).
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.*.should not be permitted to stand,"9 7 and from the interpretation placed on such opinion by the dissenting opinion of Justice
Stone, which was concurred in by Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Brandeis and Cardoza, that:
If the effect of what is now decided is to liberalize the traditional
common-law practice so that the denial of a motion for a new
trial, made on the ground that the verdict is excessive or inadequate, is subject to some sort of appellate review, the change need
not be regarded as unwelcome, even though no statute has authorized it.98

The Reisberg opinion, however, leaves much to be desired.
No reference is made either to Fraloff or Wilson and the Court
appears only obliquely to recognize the existence of any distinction between a verdict for nominal damages and a verdict for
substantial damages which is nonetheless inadequate. Aside from
observing that the verdict was for "substantial" damages and
that it demonstrated "an improper compromise between liability
and compensation," 99 the opinion is completely silent on this
question.
While Reisberg appears to be the only square holding that
Fairmount normally operates to permit appellate court reversal
in cases involving substantial though inadequate (as distinguished
from merely nominal) verdicts, inferential support for this view
is found in several cases where appellate courts have reversed
trial court rulings denying defendant's motion for a new trial on
the ground that the verdict is excessive. This, of course, is because the "no review for error of fact" rule, repudiated as a general principle in Fairmount had theretofore always been understood as requiring a denial of review in excessive as well as in
inadequate verdict cases.
What appeared to be the first major breakthrough, dealing
with review of either an excessive or inadequate verdict came
in 1925 with the decision in Cobb v. Lepisto'0 0 which was a Ninth
Circuit opinion holding that the refusal to set aside a verdict
which is grossly excessive constituted an abuse of discretion reviewable on appeal. Although this was followed with several
other decisions allowing review in excessive verdict cases, the
two leading cases are Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie,101 and Virginian
97
98
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100
101

Id. at page 486.
293 U. S. at page 489.
111 F.2d at page 598.
Cobb v. Lepisto, 6 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1925).
Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951).
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Ry. Co. v. Armentrout.'0 2 The Guthrie case was decided by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Court makes an exhaustive
consideration of Fairmount's effect upon its earlier holding in
Cobb v. Lepisto. After noting that Fairmount appeared to rest
on the ground that the nominal verdict there involved might be
explained as a finding for defendant, the Court proceeded to
interpret Fairmount as conceding that the "no review for error
of fact" rule could no longer be relied upon as a self-sufficient
basis for denying review where the verdict is attacked either as
excessive or inadequate. Cobb v. Lepisto was accordingly allowed
to stand, as supported by the "present trend of authoritative decision."1 0 3 In so stating, the Court further relied upon the decline and fall of the "no review for error of fact" rule in criminal
cases and upon Rule 75 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
relating to the record on appeal, which is even broader in scope
than the bill of exceptions to which the Supreme Court pointed in
Fairmount as justifying its statement that a statutory basis for
the "no review for error of fact" rule no longer exists. 04 Fairmount has been similarly interpreted in excessive verdict cases
arising in the Court of Appeals for nearly every Circuit. The
case of Virginian Ry. Co. v. Armentrout, reflects the general consensus of opinion with the following statement:
We do not understand the rule (as stated in Fairmount) to have
application, however, in those exceptional circumstances where the
verdict is so manifestly without support in the evidence that
failure to set it aside amounts to an abuse of discretion. In a situation of that sort, reversal is no more based on 'error in fact' than
reversal for refusal to direct a verdict for insufficiency of the

evidence. Whether there has been an abuse of discretion is a
question of law in the one case, just as is the legal sufficiency of
the evidence in the other. An appellate court is not required to
place the seal of its approval upon a judgment vitiated by an
abuse of discretion.

0

5

But whether these interpretations of Fairmont, as applied
to cases involving substantial though inadequate verdicts, is correct or whether Fairmount normally requires a denial of review
in such cases, it has nowhere been asserted that review must
under all circumstances be declined. Indeed, Fairmount itself
recognizes certain instances in which review should be granted,
one of which, "where the award is .

102

.

. in clear contravention

Virginian Ry. Co. v. Armentrout, 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1948).

103 186 F.2d at page 929.

104 Id. at page 930.
105 166 F.2d at page 408.
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of the instructions of the trial court,"'10 6 is, as we have seen, clearly
broad enough to permit review in all cases where the verdict is
attacked as inadequate save only in the particular nominal verdict situation presented in Fairmount, i.e., where the verdict can
justifiably be explained as a finding for defendant and no specific
instruction as to the impropriety of a nominal verdict is involved.
However, as the most probable meanings of the Court's phrase
have already been considered, nothing would be gained by further discussion here.
Review was also sanctioned in cases where the verdict is less
than a statutory minimum or "an amount undisputed."'107 No
federal cases involving the first type of veredict have yet arisen,
but the second is presumably illustrated by Glenwood Irr. Co. v.
Vallery,10 cited by way of illustration and apparently approved
in Fairmount. Glenwood was a negligence action to recover the
value of a trestle destroyed by fire and the jury's verdict was
approximately $1,200 less than the uncontraverted amount the
court instructed was due if plaintiff was entitled to recover. Reasoning that either an "error of law" or an "abuse of discretion"
as to a matter of fact was presented, the trial court's ruling denying plaintiff's motion for new trial was reversed. The circumstance that the trial court had expressly instructed the jury as
to the amount due was not stressed and was obviously regarded
as unimportant by the Supreme Court in Fairmount. For the
Court not only fails to refer to the instruction but also expressly
sanctions review in cases where the verdict is in "clear contravention" of the instructions of the trial court.
This phrase, it
seems clear, would cover Glenwood under the most narrow construction and there would then have been no reason for generally sanctioning review in cases where the verdict is for "less
than an amount undisputed." However, the circumstance that
Fairmount requires a denial of review in nominal verdict cases
where no instruction as to the impropriety of such a verdict has
been given, while appearing to sanction review if such an instruction is involved, leaves the question in some doubt.
Finally, it will be recalled that Fairmount allows reviews in
cases where the inadequacy of the verdict is attributable to "erroneous instructions on the measure of damages."' 0 9 This situa106 287 U. S. at page 484.
107

Id. at page 483.
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Glenwood Irr. Co. v. Vallery, 248 Fed. 483 (8th Cir. 1918).
287 U. S. at page 484, citing Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Gainey, 241
U. S.494 (1916).
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tion, of course, is not really an exception to the "no review for
error of fact rule," for review of erroneous instructions as to
damages has traditionally been available to the injured party by
a writ of error, 10 a "question of law" rather than a "question of
fact" being involved. If this technical nicety be ignored, however, a granting of review in such cases would seem to justify it
on authority in any case where the verdict's inadequacy is or may
be the product of trial court error and not merely the result of
illogicality on the part of the jury. Unfortunately, however, the
only two cases found to any extent illustrating this principle,
Pugh v. Bluff City Excersion Co.,"' to which the Supreme Court
neutrally referred in Fairmount,and Legler v. Kennington-Saenger
Theatres, Inc.,112 a recent decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, come dangerously near violating, if they do not in fact
violate, the rule of decision in Fairmount. Pugh was a wrongful death action where the jury's verdict of $1.00 might conceivably have been avoided had the trial court, (instead of giving an instruction couched in generalities), expressly instructed
that a nominal verdict was improper when the jury returned to
the court room and specifically inquired as to the propriety of
such a verdict. Legler was a personal injury action in which
the jury's verdict of $274 (only a small fraction of the actual
monetary loss shown, exclusive of pain and suffering), could possibly have resulted from error on the part of the court in submitting to the jury the issue of contributory negligence.
Although not referred to in Fairmount,another instance where
review may clearly be had is where the verdict's inadequacy results from the misconduct of counsel. This exception, if it is to
be so regarded, is impliedly sanctioned by Minneapolis, St. Paul
& S.S. Marie Ry. Co. v. Moquin, 1 3 an FELA action in which an
excessive verdict was found by the trial court to have resulted
from improper argument of plaintiff's counsel. The trial court
attempted to cure the excessiveness by requiring plaintiff to re110 James v. Evans, 149 Fed. 136 (3rd Cir. 1906), Jones v. Smith, 158
Fed. 911 (C.C.A. Penn. 1908) and Eteepain Co-op Society v. Lillback,
18 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1927).
111 Pugh v. Bluff City Excersion Co., 177 Fed. 399 (6th Cir. 1910) where
it was held that the trial court's instruction should have gone further
in preventing the jury from returning a nominal verdict.
112 Legler v. Kennington-Saenger Treatres, Inc., 172 F.2d 982 (5th Cir.
1949).
113 Minneapolis, St. Paul & S.S. Marie Ry. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U. S. 520
(1931".
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mit a portion of the verdict, plaintiff assenting in order to avoid
a new trial. On defendant's appeal from the trial court's refusal
to grant its motion for a new trial, the Supreme Court held that
a verdict "which is found to be in any degree the result of appeals to passion and preejudice" could not stand, 114 that the defect could not be cured by remittitur and a new trial should have
been granted. Although involving an excessive verdict, Moquin
seems equally applicable to inadequate verdict cases.
Oddly enough, however, the only case actually involving an
inadequate verdict attributable to the misconduct was decided
without reference to Moquin. The case in question, Indamer
1 5
Corp. v. Crandon,"
was a negligence action to recover the value
of an airplane destroyed by fire and the jury's inadequate verdict
of $10,000, (at least $27,000 less than the plane's value as shown
by the evidence), clearly resulted from defense counsel's improper
statement that plaintiff had been fully indemnified by his insurance company, the casual link being evidenced by the fact that
the jury returned after forty minutes' deliberation and asked
whether it had been established that insurance was paid. On
appeal from the trial court's ruling denying plaintiff's motion for
a new trial, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
a new trial should have been granted but confined solely to the
question of damages. The exact basis of the Court's ruling is
unclear, but the overall thrust of the opinion seems to be that
Fairmount (fortified by certain language in United States v. Johnson 1 6 and Lavender v. Kurn"7 repudiated the "no review for
error of fact" rule in cases "(w)here... the amount of damages
found by the jury bears no relation to the proof submitted"""
and where the verdict's inadequacy results from the misconduct
of an attorney. But Moquin was not mentioned and the Court
relies as heavily upon its interpretation of Fairrmount as repudiating the "no review for error of fact" rule in its absolute form
as upon the prejudicial statement of defense counsel. This is
especially significant because the case could easily have been
rested on the ground that a "procedural error of law" rather than
an "error of fact" was involved and that the "no review for error
of fact" rule, even in its pre-Fairmount form, was inapplicable.
Id. at page 521.
115 Indamer Corp. v. Crandon, 217 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1954).
116 United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106 (1946).
17 Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946).
I's 217 F.2d at page 393.
114
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In concluding this section it must be said that as a practical
matter a verdict of $1.00, as in Fairmount, can only be regarded
as a finding for defendant with an effort to free plaintiff of the
costs of suit. The $1.00 verdict cannot represent a compromise
in that nothing is to be gained by giving plaintiff only $1.00 if
the jury actually felt defendant to be liable. It is highly improbable that any juror or jurors who felt plaintiff entitled to
damages would agree to a compromise giving him only one dollar.
In direct contrast to this situation it is clear that in most cases
where the verdict is for substantial though inadequate damages,
as in Caloric, the result can do nothing but represent a compromise between liability and compensation. Such a verdict should
not be allowed to stand and where it is permitted, and no distinction is drawn between nominal and substantial verdicts, compromise verdicts are sanctioned to that extent. In these cases
both parties must be given the right to a conclusive determination
of the question of liability. The liability and damage aspects of
the case should be kept separate as much as possible and giving
countenance to the compromise verdict in the form of a substantial though inadequate verdict is not the proper method of accomplishing this result.
V. NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES ONLY
The discussion has heretofore assumed that the only possibility of relief from an inadequate verdict is a complete new
trial. There are, however, two alternative possibilities: (1) a
new trial confined solely to the question of damages and (2) a
judicial increase in the verdict commonly known as an additur.
Problems connected with the partial new trial on damages alone
will be discussed first and the discussion will encompass both
state and federal law.

A. THE STATE COURTS
The question of whether, and under what circumstances, plaintiff may retain the advantages of the jury's finding in his behalf
regarding liability and confine the new trial solely to the question of damages entails problems quite different than those where
a complete new trial is sought. At common law the jury verdict
was viewed as "wholly indivisable" and such a practice was not
allowed under any circumstances. 1 9 This rule has long since
been abandoned in England and is today followed in only a very
119 Watt v. Watt, A.C. 115 (1905).
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few states.120

In the majority of states, either by statute, rule of

court or judicial decision it is held that a new trial may, under
certain circumstances, be restricted solely to the question of damages.121 However, the trial court's refusal to do so is seldom, if
ever, held a reversible abuse of discretion.
It must be noted at the outset that there are a few specific
situations where a new trial will almost automatically be allowed
on the question of damages alone, such as where the damages
are inadequate or excessive merely because of mistake 22 or where
there was a ministerial error. 1 23 Also, there will generally be no
distinctions2 drawn between excessive and inadequate verdicts in
this area.

-

The judicial approach to this question has been substantially
uniform. Plaintiff is entitled to such a separation only where
he is able to make a "clear showing" that the inadequacy of which
he complains resulted from a cause other than jury doubt as to
defendant's liability. If such a showing is made it is generally
recognized in negligence cases that a court has the power to set
aside an inadequate verdict and to limit a new trial to the issue
of damages alone. 12 5 This view also prevails where inadequate
damages have been awarded for false representations,'2 6 malicious
120 New York expressly announced, in Reilly v. Shapmar Realty Corp.,

121

122
123
124
125

126

267 App. Div. 198, 45 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1943), that it would not allow
a new trial on damages alone where the amount of damages is unliquidated. Meyers v. Mohr, 1 Misc.2d 776, 148 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1955).
See also: Edelstein v. Kidwell, 139 Ohio St. 595, 41 N.E.2d 564 (1942)
which held that the trial court could not grant a new trial for inadequacy without vacating the entire verdict of the jury and having
a trial de novo.
Martin v. Donohue, 30 Cal. App.2d 219, 85 P.2d 913 (1938); Kovacovich v. Phelps, 62 Ariz. 193, 156 P.2d 240 (1945); Blacktin v. McCarthy,
31 Minn. 313, 42 N.W.2d 818 (1950), Lilly v. Boswell, 362 Mo. 444,
242 S.W.2d 73 (1951); Whiteside v. Harvey, 124 Colo. 561, 239 P.2d
989 (1952); Courtney v. Apple, 345 Mich. 223, 76 N.W.2d 80 (1956);
and Kappovich v. LeWinter, 43 N.J. Super. 528, 129 A.2d 299 (1957).
Rafferty v. Public Service Interstate Transp. Co., 13 N.J. Misc. 80,
177 A. 357 (1934).
Petrosino v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 1 N.J. Super. 19,
61 A.2d 746 (1948).
Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563, 97 N.E. 102 (1912), and Belcaro Realty
Inv. Co. v. Norton, 103 Colo. 485, 87 P.2d 1114 (1939).
Reay v. Beasley, 49 Ariz. 362, 66 P.2d 1043 (1937), Borgstede v. G. H.
Wetterau & Son Grocery Co., 116 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. App. 1938), Daanen
v. MacDonald, 254 Wis. 440, 37 N.W.2d 39 (1949), and Woods v. Eitze,
94 Cal. App.2d 910, 212 P.2d 12 (1949).
Busse v. White, 287 S.W. 600 (Mo. App. 1926).
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prosecution, 1 2 7 trespass quare clausum 128 and others.129

The power
rests largely within the discretion of the trial court, depending
upon the facts of each particular case, and appellate review of
the trial court's ruling will only be granted upon a showing that
there was an abuse of discretion. 130
The states have applied a variety of tests to determine whether
the new trial can be limited solely to the question of damages.
It has been held that a new trial will be granted on damages
alone where the only issue remaining undecided is that of damages, 131 where it is certain that the error complained of did not
affect the other issues, 1 2 and where passion and prejudice did
not affect the question of liability. 1 3 A careful reading of the
decisions, however, reveals that the factor deemed most relevant
in establishing such a showing concerns the relative strength or
weakness of plaintiff's showing as to defendant's liability. With
few exceptions the courts have held that a new trial confined
solely to damages is improper if the liability is contested and
the evidence is "conflicting and not free from doubt" 134 or, a fortiori, if it weighs more heavily in favor of the defendant. 135 In
these situations the plaintiff must accept a complete new trial
(if he can get it) or nothing. To sustain a motion for the separa127
128
129

Padayao v. Severence, 116 N.J.L. 285, 184 Atl. 514 (1936).
Cosgrove v. Fogg, 152 Me. 464, 54 A.2d 538 (1947).
See Flournoy v. Brown, 200 Miss. 171, 26 So.2d 351 (1946) where the

rule was held applicable to actions for breach of contract.
130 Southern Pac. Co. v. Gastelum, 36 Ariz. 106, 283 P. 719 (1929); Keogh

v. Maulding, 52 Cal. App.2d 17, 125 P.2d 858 (1942); Wax v. Althuler,
22 N.J. Super. 229, 91 A.2d 768 (1952); and Murphy v. Wilson, 141
Cal. App.2d 538, 297 P.2d 22 (1956).
131 Paul v. Western Distributing Co., 142 Kan. 816, 52 P.2d 379 (1935).
132 Monroe v. Sterling, 92 N.H. 488, 32 A.2d 820 (1943); and Esposito v.
Lazar, 2 N.J. 257, 66 A.2d 172 (1949).
133 Lundblad v. Erickson, 180 Minn. 185, 230 N.W. 473 (1930) and Rafferty v. Public Service Interstate Transp. Co., 13 N.J. Misc. 80, 177
A. 357 (1934).
134 L. C. James Motore Co. v. Whitmore, 36 Ariz. 382, 286 P. 180 (1930);
Tovrea Equipment Co. v. Gobby, 72 Ariz. 38, 230 P.2d 512 (1951);
Wilson v. Rhoades, 133 Cal. App.2d 367, 247 P.2d 727 (1952); and
Meyers v. Smith, 51 Wash.2d 700, 321 P.2d 551 (1958).
135 Kistler v. Wagoner, 315 Mich. 162, 23 N.W.2d 387 (1946), where the
defense against liability was so substantial as to preclude the partial
new trial. However, as mentioned in Section II (supra page
)
the new trial will rarely be granted where the evidence as to liability
preponderates in favor of defendant.
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tion the clear preponderance on liability must rest with plaintiff
or defendant must have conceded liability. 3 6 Proof of liability
must be exceptionally clear 3 7 and if the legal and factual issues
are intertwined and the liability and damage questions closely
interwoven a new trial on the single issue of damages is rarely
feasible. 13s A new trial should not be narrowed to the quantum
of damages unless it is plain that the error committed at the trial
was so limited in character as to be separable, with justice to both
parties, from the other issues determined by the first verdict.
There is one important though small class of cases where an
examination of the evidence as to liability is ordinarily regarded
as unnecessary to uphold the granting of a restricted new trial.
These are cases where the inadequacy of the verdict is traceable
with certainty to a cause other than juror doubt over defendant's
liability. Examples of such instances are: where the parties agree
to a limited new trial, 39 where the jury illegally apportioned
damages between two defendants' 40 and where liability is expressly conceded. 14 1 Also included in this class are many of those
cases where the damages are clearly liquidated and capable of
easy calculation. In such cases there is ordinarily no reason to
doubt that the jury was not definite in its findings as to the defendant's liability and hence no reason exists to deny the plaintiff that part of the verdict pertaining to liability. However, apart
from this limited group of cases plaintiff's right to a restricted
new trial in the vast majority of jurisdictions will depend chiefly
on the state of the evidence as to liability. Unless such evidence
preponderates in his favor, or he can "clearly show" that the issues
blended, this exof negligence and damage are 'not inseparably
1 42
traordinary form of relief will be denied.

136

Ready v. Iafeman, 239 Wis. 1, 300 N.W. 480 (1941); Marvin v. Byrd,

67 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1953), and Kovacovich v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 62
Ariz. 193, 156 P.2d 240 (1945) and liability was admitted.
137 Lundblad v. Erickson, 180 Minn. 185, 230 N.W. 473 (1930), and Degen-

ring v. Kinble, 115 N.J. L 379, 180 Atl. 685 (1935).
138 Munsey v. Safeway Stores, 65 A.2d 598 (D.C. Mun. App. 1949) and
Toshio Hamasaki v. Flotho, 39 Cal.2d 602, 248 P.2d 910 (1952).

139 Newbury Bank v. Eastman, 44 N.H. 431 (1862).
140 Walder v. Manahan, 21 N.J. Misc. 1, 29 A.2d 395 (1942) and Paolercio
v. Wright, 2 N.J. 412, 67 A.2d 168 (1949).
141 Kovacovich v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 62 Ariz. 193, 156 P.2d 240 (1945)
and Marvin v. Byrd, 67 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1952).
142

It is uniformally recognized that a new trial should never be ordered
on the question of damages alone if there is any suspicion or inference
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One final remaining question concerns the use of the new
trial on damages alone in comparative negligence jurisdictions.
Where comparative negligence prevails the issues of liability and
damages would seem to be so closely intertwined as to preclude
the partial new trial. Further, a new trial on damages alone
would not be feasible where the jury must know the extent of
each party's liability in order to assess the damages. The case
law is otherwise. Courts in comparative negligence jurisdictions
have uniformally allowed the partial new trial without distinguish143
ing between the comparative and non-comparative situations.
44
However, the Mississippi case of Vaughan v. Bollis1 touches
slightly at the heart of the problem. Here plaintiff appealed
on the grounds of inadequacy and the Supreme Court of Mississippi granted a new trial on the question of damages alone.
Although awarding the partial new trial the court makes the
following statement:
We hold that upon a re-trial of this case, all of the facts should
be presented to the jury on the question of negligence of all parties,
including appellant, and the jury will have the right to apportion
damages under the comparative negligence statute. (Emphasis
added) 145
of a compromise between liability and compensation. See Reay v.
Beasley, 49 Ariz. 362, 66 P.2d 1043 (1937); Greenberg v. Holfeltz, 244
Minn. 175, 69 N.W.2d 369 (1955); Woods v. Eitze, 94 Cal. App.2d 910,
212 P.2d 12 (1950) and Johnson v. Sgourakis, 20 N.J. Super. 77, 89
A.2d 273 (1952). In these cases if a new trial is not granted on all
issues it is held to be an abuse of the trial court's discretion. McNear
v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 63 Cal. App.2d 11, 146 P.2d 34 (1944).
In this connection, many courts have even gone so far as to hold
than an inference that the verdict is the result of a compromise may be
drawn from the inadequacy of the damage alone. See Sussman v.
Yellow Taxi Cab Co., 7 N.J. Misc. 325, 145 Atl. 470 (1929), W. T.
Grant Co. v. Tanner, 170 Tenn. 451, 95 S.W.2d 926 (1936) and
Hendrickson v. Koppers Co., 11 N.J. 600, 95 A.2d 710 (1953). It has
been held that such an inference may be drawn from the fact that
there was a distinct conflict of evidence on the question of liability.
Farr v. Fisher, 107 Vt. 331, 178 Atl. 883 (1935) and Wright v. Estep,
194 Va. 332, 73 S.E.2d 371 (1952).
'43 Nebraska:
Harper v. Young, 139 Neb. 624, 298 N.W. 342 (1941) which
specifically granted a new trial on the issue of damages alone. However, see Harman v. Swanson, 169 Neb. 452, 100 N.W.2d 33 (1959)
which held that Nebraska would not recognize a motion for a new
trial on the issue of damages only. Mississippi: Yazoo & M.V.R.
Co. v. Scott, 108 Miss. 871, 67 So. 491 (1915) and Vaughan v. Bollis,
221 Miss. 589, 73 So.2d 160 (1954). Wisconsin: Ready v. Hafeman,
239 Wis. 1, 300 N.W. 480 (1941) and Anderson v. Tri-State Home Imp.
Co., 268 Wis. 455, 67 N.W.2d 853 (1955).
144 Vaughan v. Bollis, 221 Miss. 589, 73 So.2d 160 (1954).
145 Id. at page 163.
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Just what type of evidence is to be presented to the jury in this
new trial on damages only is not speficied but it is apparent that
upon re-trial the jury will be expected to make some determination as to liability. In other words, the new trial will not actually
be limited to the question of damages alone. The propriety of
this type of a holding will not be discussed but for purposes of
this analysis it is clear that Mississippi, while ordering a new trial
on the issue of damages alone, does not intend that all evidence
as to liability be excluded. In the remainder of comparative negligence jurisdictions, where partial new trials have been granted,
the complications are not discussed and it is apparently assumed
that the issue of liability has been settled. This seems to be a
questionable result. In the average comparative negligence situation, assuming that there is some evidence as to plaintiff's contributory negligence, there is never a conclusive determination
of liability and a new trial should not be granted on the issue
of damages alone.
B.

TnE FEDERAL COURTS
At an early date the United States Supreme Court announced
that the practice of granting a new partial trial was not to be
commended. 46 However, in the 1915 opinion in Norfolk Southern
Railroad Company v. Ferebee,'4 7 such a practice was recognized
with the following note of caution:
Before granting partial new trials, in any case under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, it should, as said by the Supreme Court
of North Carolina, 'clearly appear that the matter involved is entirely distinct and separable from other matters involved in the
issue . . . and that no possible injustice can be done to either
party.' In cases of this character we148do not know that the practice is generally to be commended.
The requirements to be met before such a remedy will be granted
are much the same as those discussed earlier in analyzing the
approach taken by the state courts. It has been held by the
Supreme Court that:
Where the practice permits a partial new trial, it may not properly be resorted to unless it clearly appears that the issue to be
re-tried is so distinct and separable from the others that a trial
of it alone may be had without injustice. 149
American R. R. Co. v. Didrickson, 227 U.S. 145 (1913) and Grand
Trunk Ry. v. Lindsay, 233 U.S. 42 (1914).
147 Southern Railroad Company v. Ferebee, 238 U.S. 269 (1915).
148 238 U.S. at 274, citing Jarrett v. Trunk, 144 N.C. 299, 56 S.E. 937
(1907).
-49 Gasoline Products Co., Inc. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494,
500 (1931), citing Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Ferebee, supra note 147.
146
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Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1939 the question of partial new trials has been governed by
Rule 59 (a) which states that: "A new trial may be granted to
all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues."'150 This
has been interpreted to mean that a reviewing court may, when
remanding the cause for a new trial, limit the new trial to issues
affected by the error whenever, these issues are entirely distinct
from matters involved in other issues and trial can be had without danger of complication with other matters. 15 ' This definition
includes the issue of damages and it is uniformally held that, under Rule 59, a new trial will be granted on the issue of damages
alone where there is no inference of a compromise or unsatisfactory
proof of liability, 152 where the verdict failed to include all elements
of damages as instructed by the court, 158 or where the verdict
rendered was uncertain as to the amount of damages. 154 Thus,
the requirements for the granting of a new trial on the issue of
damages alone are much the same as those in the state courts.
A partial new trial will not be granted unless the issues are
entirely separate and distinct and only where there is no inference of a compromise or sympathy verdict.
VI. THE ADDITUR
Seldom has a procedural device been more overrated, more
misunderstood, and more productive of serious injustice than the
practice of increasing the verdict by a court order, known as
additur, in lieu of and to save the expense of a new trial for inadequacy of the verdict. Actually of extremely limited usefulness, the additur has nonetheless received the enthusiastic approval
of the commentators as a general cure-all for inadequate verdicts.
The term additur is used herein to describe an order by which
a plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the ground of inadequate
damage is denied on the condition that the defendant consent to
a specified increase of the award.
15Q Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 (a).
15 1 Atkinson v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 143 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1944) and
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Bennett, 251 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1958).
152 Haug v. Grim, 251 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1958) and Southern Ry. Co. v.
Madden, 235 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1956).
U 3

154

Yates v. Dann, 11 F.R.D. 386 (D.C. Del. 1951).
Tompkins v. Pilots Ass'n for Bay and River Deleware, 32 F. Supp.
439 (D.C. Pa. 1940) and Twenty-One Mining Co. v. Original Sixteen
To One Mine, 265 F. 469 (9th Cir. 1920) which was prior to the
adoption of Federal Rule 59.
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The practice of increasing the amount fixed by the verdict
of a jury in an action at law was recognized, though seldom exercised, at common law. 15,'
The first additur cases appeared in
this country after the Civil War' 5 6 and the procedure has been
5 7
upheld in the majority of cases wherein it has been considered.
However, in most of those cases upholding the use of an additur
the damages were ascertainable by a fixed formula or were uncontested. In this area of liquidated damages it is argued that
the additur order does not usurp the function of the jury's fact
finding power as there is only one amount of damages permissible
under the evidence. Thus, since defendant has been found liable,
neither he, nor the plaintiff, is prejudiced because of the additur.
Those cases which uphold the trial court's additur order in unliquidated personal injury actions are much less numerous. 5 A large portion of the difficulty has arisen from a failure to
distinguish between additur cases where the verdict is increased
over the objection of one of the parties and those in which it is
not, either because no one objects or because the party objecting
to the increase is given the option of accepting it or having a new
trial. Obviously, only the former group of cases fairly present
the question of the propriety of the additur practice. The cases
in the latter group either involve the application of conventional
15 Brown v. Seymour, 1 Wils. 5 (1742). The additur power was exercised affirmatively in Burton v. Baynes, Barnes Practice Cases, 153
(1733). See the excellent historical discussion of this remedy in
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1934).
156 Carr v. Minor, 42 Ill. 179 (1866) and James v. Morey, 44 ill. 352 (1867).
157 Alabama: Kiaas v. American Bakeries Co., 231 Ala. 278, 164 So. 565
(1935); Delaware: Rudnick v. Jacobs, 9 Harr. 169, 197 Atl. 381 (1938);
Georgia: E. Tis Napier Co. v. Gloss, 150 Ga. 561, 104 S.E. 230 (1920)

(additur granted on defendant's counterclaim); Illinois: Carr v. Minor
and James v. Morey, supra note 156; Massachusetts: Clark v. Henshaw
Motor Co., 246 Mass. 386, 140 N.E. 593 (1923) where the refusal of
the trial court to grant a new trial was upheld where defendant
stipulated to an increase in the judgment; New Jersey: Gaffney v.
Illingsworth, 90 N.J.L. 490, 101 Atl. 243 (1917); Washington: Clausing
v. Kershaw, 129 Wash. 67, 224 Pac. 573 (1924). A special rule is
announced in Wisconsin where it is held that the court can use the
additur if defendant consents to pay the largest amount which a
jury could assess under the proof, even without plaintiff's consent.
See Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 274 (1927).

3.5

Gaffney v. Illingsworth, supra note 157, and Clausing v. Kershaw,
supra note 157. See Lemon v. Campbell, 136 Pa. Super. 370, 7 A.2d
643 (1939) and Lorf v. City of Detroit, 145 Mich. 265, 108 N.W. 661
(1906) where the use of an additur in cases of unliquidated damages
was unconditionally denied.
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principles of waiver or a situation where the additur, by its own
terms, does not take effect. Illustrative of basic waiver situations
are: (1) cases where both parties assent to an additur which unconditionally increases the verdict and makes no provision for
a new trial; (2) cases where a new trial is ordered unless both
parties agree to an increase in the verdict and both do agree; and,
(3) cases where a new trial is ordered unless defendant agrees to
an increase in the verdict, defendant does agree and plaintiff,
failing to object, accepts the increased verdict. Such cases, in
effect, involve no more than voluntary settlements between the
parties which would have almost certainly taken place without
any action by the court. The court's action, while harmless, is
also largely superflous. The typical situation where the additur,
by its own terms, does not take effect is presented by an order
granting a new trial unless defendant agrees to an increase in
the verdict, defendant refuses to agree, and a new trial follows
as a matter of course. Here the additur is entirely superflous
and the only question is whether plaintiff is entitled to a new trial.
The only additurs not open to a charge of superfluousness are
those whose effect is to increase the verdict over the objection of
one of the litigants. The problem is two-fold: When may the
verdict properly be increased over the objection of defendant and
when over the objection of plaintiff? In order to avoid misunderstanding, the typical procedural setting where defendant objects
is as follows. The jury returns an inadequate verdict. Plaintiff
moves for a new trial or requests an additur and the trial court
issues an order whose effect is to require defendant to pay plaintiff an amount larger than the amount of the jury's verdict. The
order gives defendant no option of refusing to pay and having a
new trial. Defendant, it should be noted, may or may not want
the verdict set aside and a new trial granted. The question of
whether he is entitled to such relief is not discussed here. Obviously, if defendant is entitled to a new trial plaintiff is not entitled to an additur over the objection of defendant. The situation
here is that defendant is either unable or unwilling to have the
verdict set aside on his own motion and objects to being absolutely
required to pay plaintiff an amount larger than the jury's verdict.
Policy-wise, it seems clear that plaintiff should never be allowed an additur over the objection of defendant where the inadequacy of the verdict may have resulted from juror doubt over
defendant's liability. For to do so would give plaintiff something
the jury never intended that he should have. At most, then, we
can only be concerned with the relatively infrequent instances
where the evidence as to liability clearly preponderates for plain-
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tiff and/or there are other circumstances strongly suggesting that
the inadequacy of the verdict was attributable to some other cause
other than juror doubt over defendant's liability, i.e., circumstances
showing that the jury in fact found that defendant was liable.
But there will ordinarily be a serious problem with reference
to the use of the additur even in this relatively narrow body of
cases. The typical case is one involving unliquidated damages
where it is impossible to accurately say what the jury should have
awarded in damages. The permissible range of variance will often
be in the thousands or even in the tens of thousands. There is,
in short, the problem that the jury has not awarded plaintiff enough
but that we do not know what "enough" is and that to let the trial
judge decide over defendant's objection is to permit him to substitute his own judgment for that of a jury.
The most apparent obstacle to any form of compulsory additur
lies in the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
and the various constitutional limitations upon right to a jury trial
within each state. The leading case on this subject is Dimick v.
Schiedt,15 9 which held that a federal court could not increase a
jury's award without the consent of both parties. It was pointed
out that any attempt by the court to fix damages over plaintiff's
objection constituted a violation of the Seventh Amendment. The
most recent state court opinion dealing with the constitutional
aspects of the additur is the California case of Dorsey v. Barba," "
which held that a denial of plaintiff's motion for a new trial conditioned on defendant's consent to an increase in the amount of
damages constituted an impairment of plaintiff's constitutional
right to a jury trial. The opinion dealt with Article I, Section 7
of the California Constitution which was interpreted much the
same as the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Both the Dimick and Dorsey cases have been soundly, and somewhat unjustly, criticized by the commentators with some calling
for constitutional amendments to counteract their effect.
Very few additur cases have arisen where plaintiff's right to
a jury determination of unliquidated damages was at issue, however, it would seem that if any form of compulsory additur exists
there is a definite violation of either party's right to a bona fide
159

Dimick v. Schidt, 293 U.S. 474 (1934).

But see United States v. Ken-

nesaw Mountain Battlefield Ass'n, 99 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1938) which
distinguished the Dimick case and sustained the use of additur in a

condemnation proceeding.
160 Dorsey v. Barba, 38 A.C. 402, 240 P.2d 604 (1952).
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trial on the issue of liability. This results in a deprivation of that
party's constitutional right to trial by jury whether under the
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution or under
the various state constitutional provisions providing that the right
of trial by jury shall be secured to all and remain inviolate. It
has been argued by proponents of the constitutional validity of\
the additur order that at common law, redetermination of damages
by a new jury was unknown and that, therefore, one jury verdict
satisfies the constitutional guarantee. 161 This argument is clearly
defective and should not prevail. If the jury verdict were allowed
to stand there would be no constitutional violation; however, the
exercise of the additur privilege causes this one verdict to be without effect. The damages are determined by the trial court and the
complaining party has not received even one jury verdict on this
question.
What could be the most important argument in opposition to
the use of the additur has been, apparently, overlooked in the opinions and by all commentators on the subject. This important point
lies in the fact that every time an additur order is used or upheld
there is a sanction of the compromise verdict. Presumably, every
case in which an additur might be used is one where the verdict is
substantial though inadequate and the result of a compromise.
There seems to be little doubt that the additur should not be allowed to prevail in the nominal verdict situation as such a verdict
is, in the vast majority of jurisdictions, recognized as a finding for
the defendant. Therefore, where liability has been compromised,
in the substantial though inadequate case, an adoption of the additur as an additional mechanism for correcting an inadequate
verdict does nothing more than add to a verdict which should only
be reversed. There has never been a conclusive determination of
liability in these cases and without such a determination no adequate award of damages should be attempted.
One further argument in favor of the additur is advanced.
This is based on the theory that additur and remittitur are not
substantially distinguishable and if remittitur is sound it follows
that additur should also prevail. While it is true that the practice
of remittitur is universally accepted, it does not logically follow
that additur should also become so accepted. In remittitur cases
the verdict is excessive and there appears to be a presumption that
the jury has made a valid finding on liability. It is quesitonable
101

See dissent of Justice Stone in Dimick v. Schiedt, supra note 159 and
dissent of Justice Traynor in Dorsey v. Barba, supra note 160. See
also: Note, 33 MICH. L. REV. 138, 140 (1933).
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whether an excessive verdict would result where there was any
juror doubt on liability. The one exception to this might be where
the damages were "monstrous" and so high that it was clear that
the jury allowed passion and prejudice to guide their actions to
such an extent as to interfere even with the issue of liability. However, this exception will very rarely arise and the excessive verdict can usually be said to conclusively establish the question of
defendant's liability. In this instance a reasonable argument might
be made that the parties are not being deprived of a jury trial on
the issue of liability and, hence, a remittitur should be allowed.
However, this argument has absolutely no merit in the additur
situation where the original award is more than likely a compromise in itself.
In conclusion it is apparent that any form of compulsory additur will result in a violation of the constitutional safeguard of
trial by jury. Whether it be compulsory additur for both parties
or where the consent of only one party is required, there is a violation of someone's right to a bona fide trial on the issue of liability.
If both parties agree to an increase, thereby waiving their right to
object, there is, in effect, nothing more than a voluntary settlement
and this cannot rightfully be classified as an additur situation. The
additur order is the most unfair and unsatisfactory of all mechanisms for correcting an inadequate verdict. Such a procedure
should not be adopted as it dispenses with any jury determination
of liability and damages and represents nothing more than a judicial
determination of these questions in direct conflict with the constitutional provisions safeguarding the right to trial by jury, to say
nothing of the extent to which compromise verdicts are sanctioned
by its unjustifiable usage.
VII.

CONCLUSION

It has been the purpose here to point out the importance of
having a uniform set of rules both in the state courts and in the
federal judicial system upon which to base the trial court ruling
on a motion for new trial due to inadequacy of damages awarded.
It is clear that state appellate courts have gone a long way in
formulating a definite set of principles delineating when trial
judges must grant or deny a new trial for inadequacy. The federal
courts, on the other hand, have done almost nothing to guide federal district judges in this matter. Furthermore, the federal courts
have not advanced to the point where they draw the important
distinction between nominal verdicts and those which are substantial though clearly inadequate. The Fairmount and Caloric
cases have created an obstacle that must be removed. A nominal
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verdict, as discussed herein, should always be interpreted as a perversely-expressed finding for defendant while the substantial
though inadequate verdict should be governed by those four classes
of cases in jurisdictions which examine the evidence as to defendant's liability prior to ruling on the motion. In all of these cases
the appellate courts should re-examine the evidence on liability
and the four rules discussed herein should serve as invaluable
guides to trial judges when ruling on new trial motions grounded
upon inadequacy of damages awarded.
Where the plaintiff wishes to retain the benefits of the jury's
finding in his behalf regarding liability there are two possible
mechanisms at his disposal. These are the additur and a partial
new trial limited only to the issue of damages. It has been submitted that the additur is nothing more than an overrated and misunderstood device which, when used within constitutional limitations, is of extremely limited usefulness. The partial new trial,
on the other hand, can be a very useful mechanisn. However, it
should be used with extreme caution and never in a situation where
there is an inference of a compromise or unsatisfactory proof of
liability.
With the emphasis now being put upon the size of verdicts,
appellate courts will be confronted with a growing number of
cases calling for review of a ruling on the motion for new trial
based upon inadequacy of damages awarded. The increase in these
cases makes apparent the need for a uniform set of rules in this
area. It is hoped that this discussion points out those needs and
that the suggestions included assist in some degree toward classification of the law relative to inadequate verdicts.

